An ideal of American jurisprudence is that recourse to judicial process shall not be denied because of the lack of financial resources.' State courts have sought to follow this principle, but in applying it have at times fallen short of their professed standards. ' With the passing of the sixth amendment in 1791, a federal court could not deprive an accused of his life or liberty without the assistance of counsel. In cases of indigency, such assistance was furnished free to the defendant. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. A provision of the Illinois constitution of 1818 provided that every person in Illinois "ought to obtain right and justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformably with the laws". ILL. CONST. art. VIII, §12 (1818) . A similar provision is incorporated in the present Illinois constitution. ILL. CoNsT. art. II, §19 (1870).
2 Sykes v. Warden, 201 Md. 662, 93 A.2d 549 (1953.) (court refused to appoint counsel for an indigent's appeal); State v. Cater, 109 Iowa 69, 80 N.W. 222 (1899) (court has no authority to aid an indigent in preparing appeal); De Long v. Muskegon County, Mich. 568, 69 N.W. 1115 (1897 (court refused to compensate an attorney appointed to aid an indigent).
3 See, e.g., CALIF. PEN. CODE §987 (Deering 1941); ILL. REv. STAT. tit. 34 §163j, 163c, 163g (1955) ; N. Y. Cams. CODE c. 883 (1949) . 4 Trovar v. State, 39 Ariz. 528, 8 P.2d 247 (1932) .
or waiver of the posting of security bonds.5
In addition, a majority of states provide an indigent with a free transcript of the trial court record in all criminal cases. 6 In several states, a 'State v. Watson, 208 N.C. 70, 179 S.E. 455 (1935) . Aid has been denied, on occasion, for technical reasons, such as failure to meet statutory requirements for, or improper filing of a formal document stating the defendant's poverty and asking for available relief in defraying court costs. State v. Sallee, 151 Ore. 483, 48 P.2d 770 (1935) ; State v. Pike, 205 N.C. 176, 170 S.E. 649 (1933) ; State v. Knight, 20 Iowa 819,216 N.W. 104 (1927) . Although it is in the discretion of the trial court to determine the defendant's pauper status, an abuse of this discretion will usually be cause for reversal by the reviewing court. Lenora v. State, 510 Okla. Crim. 291, 1 P.2d 832 (1931) . 6 Az.
CODE ANN. §44-2525 (1939) ; Aax. STAT. ANN. §22-357 (1947) §252.20 (1945) . 7 N. J. STAT. AiN. §2:195-22 (1939) (only when conviction is for first degree murder and sentence is death); PA. STAT. AN. tit. 19, §1232 (Purdon 1954 (only when conviction is for first degree murder); VT. REv. STAT. §1421 (1947) (only in sentences of death or imprisonment of ten years or more). In Ohio, the awarding of a free transcript is apparently left to the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g. State v. Trunzo, 137 N.E. 2d 511 (Ohio 1956 (1894) . which held that appellate review is not a right guaranteed to the individual by the United States Constitution. However, the Griffin case modified the Durston rule by holding that once a state sets up a system of review, it cannot offer this privilege on a discriminatory basis. Illinois afforded appellate review on equal terms to both indigents and nonindigents. There was therefore no affirmative descrimination against indigents by the state. However, the Court held that, by affording appellate review only to those who could afford to pay the necessary costs, the state had acted in a discriminatory manner. The state was thus required to correct an inequity produced by economic circumstances.
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REQUIREMENTS OF THE GRIFFIN RULING
The Court did not expressly formulate the procedure that a state must follow in affording full appellate review to indigent defendants. However, the Court indicated that conformity to its ruling would not necessarily require the granting of a free transcript in every appeal by an indigent. The Court implied that a state must provide a defendant with whatever means are essential in each particular case for full appellate review.
Appeals which involve the issue of whether a conviction is against the weight of the evidence generally require a full transcript of the trial court record. 16 401 (1955) . 28 A judge's note is an account of the proceedings prepared by the judge while a bystander's bill may be prepared by any witness to the trial. See note 18 sapra. 19 This procedure has been used in New York where the entire record is not essential to the appeal.
After the typewritten record is sent up to the appellate court, the adversaries then print their brief and, as an appendix to the brief, print so much would serve as a less expensive, but nevertheless adequate, mode of preparing the appellant's bill of exceptions. Where these alternative methods of specifying errors in the trial court are used, their cost of preparation, under the policy of the Griffin ruling, must be borne by the state in cases involving indigents. The cost of these alternative devices, however, would likely be far less than that of transcripts.
In addition to a transcript or other method of describing the pertinent parts of the trial, a brief, setting forth the defendant's arguments in regard to the alleged errors, is usually required for full review by an appellate court. 20 .
In most states this brief must be in printed form.
2 Since this printed brief is usually equally as essential to full review as the bill of exceptions, in instances where the indigent defendant could not afford the cost of such a brief, denial of a free printed brief may constitute a violation by the state of the fourteenth amendment. Thus, a reasonable application of the Griffin principle would require a state to pay the cost of preparing printed briefs, in addition to transcripts, in appeals by indigents.
2 An inexof the record as each party desires the court to read. The appellant must also print in the appendix of his initial brief the judgment or order appealed from, the opinion of the lower court, findings of fact, and conclusions of law. 17 N.Y.S.B.A. BULL.
(1955).
20 Since questions not presented and argued in the assignment of errors are considered as waived, a brief is often essential for appeal. Harrison v. State, 231 Ind. 147, 106 N.E.2d 912 (1952) 22 Of course only a brief adequate for full review should be furnished without cost to the indigent by the state. If, for example, the indigent appellant can state his arguments adequately in a fifteen page brief, the state should not be obliged to furnish an elaborate two hundred page brief. In a jurisdiction, such as Alabama, which makes the right of appeal in criminal cases one of substance, a brief is not essential to the consideration of errors on review. In these states the appellate court has the duty to [Vol. 47 pensive solution to this problem would be the relaxation of the requirement that briefs be printed. In cases involvingindigents an appellate court should allow the appellant to submit a less costly typewritten brief.
Another expense often involved in an appeal is the cost of obtaining counsel to prepare and argue the appellant's case. The Griffin principle should not require that a court furnish free counsel to the indigent. Counsel, unlike the bill of exceptions and the appellate brief, is helpful but generally not essential to the defendant in securing appellate review since an indigent may personally prepare and argue his case on appeal. (Ohio 1956 ). It does not appear that the Griffin rule has altered the present requirement that a state need furnish an indigent with free counsel at the trial only when denial of counsel would deny the defendant a fair trial. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) . Where absence of counsel at the trial would not deny the indigent a fair trial, a state's failure to provide such assistance would not constitute discrimination against the indigent. Of course, as a practical matter most states do assign counsel to all indigent criminal defendants. See note 3 supra. 24 Following the Griffin decision, the Supreme Court of Illinois proclaimed a rule authorizing the trial judge to award free transcripts to indigent appellants. "In case of any defendant sentenced to imprisonment after April 23, 1956, when upon verified petition of the defendant, judge who imposes sentence, or in his absence any other judge of the court, finds that the defendant is without financial means with which to obtain a transcript of the proceedings of his trial, the judge shall order the reporter to transcribe his notes, in whole or part, as is appropriate, and to deliver the transcript to the Certainly the Illinois court should be commended for promptly adopting the principles of the Griffin holding. However, the Illinois ruling failed to distinguish between cases in which a transcript is essential for review and cases in which such a transcript would be merely superfluous. Where a "judge's note" might be adequate for the preparation of the indigent's bill of exceptions, Illinois is now obliged to furnish the more expensive partial or complete trial court transcript. tit. 37, §163 b, f. (1955) .
26 Just as the application of the Griffin ruling to misdemeanors might be questioned, an extension of the ruling to civil proceedings would not be reasonable. A distinction may be drawn between criminal and civil cases. In criminal cases the need for appeal arises as a result of some prior affirmative act on the part of the state. In a civil case, the plight of the contestants has normally not been brought about through any affirmative act by the state. Therefore, the state should be held responsible for the appeals of indigents in the former cases, but not in the latter. In addition, as a practical matter it is unlikely that an indigent would be sued and equally unlikely that an indigent possessing a valid claim for a money judgment would be without aid to press his claim.
27 In the Griffin case, a state statute which au-between misdemeanors and felonies, as between capital and non-capital offenses, lies in the degree of punishment. 5 For this reason, the Griffin interpretation of the fourteenth amendment may require that a state afford aid in securing appellate review to the indigent misdemeanant as well as to the indigent felon.
Nevertheless, there may be little demand for the assistance which is available to the indigent misdemeanant by virtue of the Griffin holding. Conviction for a misdemeanor usually carries with it a sentence not exceeding one year's imprisonment. 29 The indigent misfeasor could in many instances serve his sentence and regain his freedom in a period shorter than that between the dates of conviction and review. He might often prefer this to the inconvenience of an appeal. A defendant normally can avoid imprisonment entirely by appealing and remaining free on bail. However, since an indigent would not have funds to secure a transcript, he would probably be equally unable to post bail. A problem would exist only in the case of an indigent misdemeanant who would insist upon clearing his record by appellate review. However, a misdemeanant interested in clearing his record would in all probability be able to pay the costs attendant upon an appeal.
The Illinois court rule, which was promulgated after the Griffin decision, did not expressly indicate to which type of criminal case it should apply. 5 However, the rule stated that it shall apply to "any defendant sentenced to imprisonment." Narrowly defined, "imprisonment" might refer exclusively to those incarcerated in the penitentiary. Normally, only those persons convicted of a felony would receive a penitentiary sentence. On the other hand, a broader definition of "imprisonment" would include inmates of the county jail, most of whom would be misdemeanants. If it were to be interpreted narrowly so as to exclude thorized the award of free transcripts only in cases where the death sentence was involved was considered an inadequate compliance with the dictates of the fourteenth ammendment. misdemeanants, the Illinois ruling may not be in conformity with the dictates of the Griffin holding.
THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE GRIFFIN RULING
The majority of the United States Supreme Court in the Griffin case failed to indicate whether its holding should be applied to those indigents who were denied appeals prior to that decision, as well as to those indigents who are convicted subsequent to that case. 31 The Court's lack of unanimity on the issue is evidenced by the conflicting views of the concurring opinion, which indicated that the majority had erred in not declaring the ruling retroactive, 3 2 and the minority opinion, which felt that the majority had erroneously formulated a retroactive ruling.3
If interpreted retrospectively, the Griffin ruling would have application to two types of situations: (a) where the indigent had requested and was refused a transcript subsequent to his conviction, and (b) where the indigent did not request a transcript following his conviction. In both instances, in order to obtain a free transcript or other appellate assistance, a defendant must show that he had not waived his right to a transcript at his original trial. Where the defendant subsequent to his sentence had made a timely request for a transcript of 31 Justice Black, in authoring the majority opinion, failed to indicate the scope of the ruling. "The sole question for us to decide,.. . is whether due process or equal protection has been violated" in this instance. 351 U.S. at 16.
3 Justice Frankfurter implied that, while the majority holding did not make the ruling retroactive, the law should allow those convicted prior to the decision to avail themselves of the new law. "We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law, and therefore, that those who did not avail themselves of it waived their rights". 351 U.S. at 26.
33Justice Burton stated that: "Mr. Justice Black's opinion is not limited to the ftiture. It holds that a past as well as a future conviction of crime in a state court is invalid when the state has failed to furnish a free transcript to an indigent defendant.... ." 351 U.S. at 29.
[Vol. 47 the trial record and this request was denied, he should not be considered to have waived his opportunity to avail himself of the Griffin ruling. Since a defendant who had requested a transcript at the time of his trial would not have waived his right to a free transcript, he would now, under the Grifin ruling, be entitled to such assistance.
The case ef a convict who did not apply for a free transcript following his sentence, but who now asserts a claim under the Griffin ruling to such assistance poses a different problem. The indigent must answer the argument that since he did not request a free transcript following his conviction, he waived his right to now assert this claim.3 The United States Supreme Court has declared that an effective waiver of the right to appellate process must be conscious, that is, made with knowledge of that right.n Knowledge of a right assumes the existence of that right. The Griffin principle is new law, in that it affords indigents rights heretofore nonexistent. Therefore, since a defendant could reasonably have presumed at the time of his conviction that a free transcript was unobtainable, failure to request such aid could not have constituted a conscious waiver of financial assistance.
After establishing that he has not waived his rights created by / the Griffin decision, a defendant must show that he was indigent during the period immediately following his trial when petition for review should have been filed. 36 The fact that he is now impoverished or 206, 209 (1951) . In that case, it was held that a prisoner did not waive his right to post-conviction review by coramt nobis and habeas corpus petitions when, because of the lax enforcement of prison rules, he filed a tardy motion for appeal.
36By Illinois statute, in order to petition for review, an appellant must furnish the trial judge with a bill of exceptions, including a transcript of the trial record, within one hundred days after a judgment of conviction is entered, or within such further time thereafter as shall within such one had been a pauper before his trial should not satisfy the proof of indigency required to obtain a transcript or other appellate assistance. However, if a defendant had requested a free transcript at the time of his conviction and this request was denied on grounds other than failure to meet the forma pauperis requirements, 37 his contention of prior indigency should be presumed to be true, a presumption which could be rebutted by contrary evidence presented by the state. This presumption is based upon the difficulty of resurrecting the past in order to establish a defendant's indigence at the time of his trial. However, if a defendant had made no request for a free transcript following his sentence, he should have the burden of substantiating his allegations of prior indigency.
35
Illinois, several months after it had enacted a court rule which afforded free transcripts prospectively to indigents, amended that ruling so that it would apply retroactively.
39
This amendment did not require a defendant to have made a request for a free transcript at the time of his conviction. In addition, the hundred days be filed by the court. IIL. REv.
STAT. tit. 110, §101.65 (1955).
37A formal application declaring poverty and requesting aid. See note 5 supra.
33 This contention could be supported by affidavits from the defendant's attorney, friends, or family, as well as by a sworn statement by the defendant himself. As an added safeguard, after the indigent has been warned of the penalties of perjury, the trial court clerk should write to the defendant's next-of-kin informing them of his financial condition and requesting their aid. amended ruling required that the defendant be without financial means to pay the costs of a transcript at the time of filing his petition for a transcript, as well as at the time of his trial. This position seems unreasonable since a defendant might have been unable'to pay for the transcript following his conviction, but may now, perhaps several years after that time, have the funds to do so. The fact that a convict is no longer a pauper should not prevent him from obtaining, at his own expense, the appellate review which formerly had been denied to him because of indigency. Although a convict who can now pay for a transcript should not be provided with a free one, he should nonetheless be afforded the same opportunity of obtaining review as the person who was indigent at the time of trial and has remained so. Because that convict was prevented from obtaining free transcript at his conviction, and therefore was unable to appeal within the prescribed statutory period, he should not be allowed to obtain such review. After it has been established that the appellant has not waived his rights under a retroactive application of the Griffin ruling, and that he was in fact indigent subsequent to his conviction in the trial court, the indigent may proceed to assert his appeal of the case on the merits by means of the appropriate postconviction proceeding.
40 A post-conviction ap-
40
In the absence of a post-conviction act, several common law methods of obtaining appellate review are available. Some states have expanded the scope of habeas corpus beyond its traditional confinement to jurisdictional questions, so as to include review of any alleged constitutional violation. See, e.g., Sneed v. Mays, 66 So.2d 865 (Fla. 1953); Foster v. State, 97 Okla. Crim. 133, 259 P.2d 542 (1953) ; In re Wallace, 24 Cal.2d 933, 152 P.2d 1 (1944) . In other states coram nobis may be used as a means of asserting alleged violations of constitutional rights which cannot be reached by habeas corpus. See, e.g., State ex rel MacMianomon v. Blackford Circuit Court, 229 Ind. 3, 95 N.E. 2d 556 (1950); Johnson v. Williams, 244 Ala. 391, 13 So. 2d 683 (1943); Lyons v. Goldstein, 290 N.Y. 19, 47 N.E. 2d 425 (1943) . Coram vobis is another common law mode of post-conviction review. A corain vobis petition is directed to the appellate court as opposed peal, under state law, must generally be brought within a limited period following the appellant's conviction.a However, delay in appealing is excusable unless caused by the negligence of the appellant. The Griffin ruling is new law. Hence, the delay of an indigent, who was convicted prior to the Griffin case, in filing his post-conviction appeal would not be due to any negligence on his part and should be considered excusable.41
CONCLUSION
The Griffin ruling requires that a state afford indigent defendants in felony cases, and perhaps in misdemeanor cases as well, full appellate review. Whether this end can be achieved only to coram nobis where plea is made to the trial court. See, e.g., People v. Zajkowski, 121 N.Y.S.2d 586 (County Ct. 1953); Leavitt v. State, 116 Fla. 738, 156 So. 904 (1934) . In some jurisdictions audita querela is available to present an affirmative defense which could not reasonably have been raised at the trial court level. See, e.g., Robertson v. §15-217 to -22 (1953 tit. 38, §826 (1955) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. §15-217 (1953) . 4 See note 35 supra. 4 Because of the lapse of time between trial and post-conviction review, a bill of exceptions prepared from memory, e.g., judge's notes, probably would be inadequate. Therefore, in most retroactive applications a state would be bound to furnish the indigent appellant with a free transcript. by means of a free transcript depends upon the nature of the exceptions being taken. The state, in any event, must afford the indigent without cost all the essentials for full review in each particular case.
Since the United States Supreme Court has not declared itself on the issue of retroactivity," it appears that state courts must decide for themselves whether to apply the Griffin ruling retroactively.
5 Although Illinois has recently seen fit to declare the Griffin ruling retroactive, 4 " some jurisdictions have implied that they favor limiting the ruling to the prospective, 47 while other courts appear to have entirely ignored the decision.
48
"The Court's lack of unanimity in the Griffin case renders it difficult to prophesy with any certainty what the Court will do if they choose to decide the issue of retroactivity. Justice Frankfurter stands squarely for a retroactive interpretation of the ruling. Justices Burton, Harlan, and Reed, since they oppose the rule on principle would probably vote against its retroactive application. That leaves in doubt the votes of Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, Clark, and Brennan, who has recently been appointed to replace the retired Justice Minton. It will take four out of the remaining five votes to make the ruling retroactive. Justice Frankfurther might have difficulty in converting four of his colleagues to his viewpoint. 45 Where the United States Supreme Court has not indicated whether its ruling is to be applied retroactively, a state may apply such a ruling prospectively without violating due process. Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil and Refining Co., 287 U. S. 358 (1932) .
46 See note 39 supra. 47 In United States v. Sanders, 142 F.Supp. 638 (D.Md. 1956) a federal district court implied that the Griffin principle should be applied prospectively. The court reasoned that the defendant's counsel must request a free transcript following the trial court proceedings, and failing to do this, counsel waived any future right to such transcript.
43 In State v. Trunzo, 137 N.E. 2d 511 (Ohio 1956) , the Ohio Court of Appeals held that an indigent "defendant is not entitled, as a matter of law, to a bill of exceptions transcribed at the State's expense for his use in an appeal from a judgment of guilty." The court ruled that an Ohio statute, allowing a transcript to be granted in the discretion of the Illinois, through the adoption of a court rule, has complied with the Griffin doctrine in a manner which appears inadequate in several respects. First, the Illinois ruling requires that the indigent be given a partial or complete transcript no matter what type of error is alleged. Second, the ruling is ambiguous as to whether it is to be applied both in cases of felonies and misdemeanors. Third, the retroactive amendment to the ruling sets forth a discriminatory test in regard to proof of indigency.
State courts, which must now deal with this problem, should exercise great care in granting free transcripts to indigents. A promiscuous granting of free transcripts might encourage frivolous appeals at a considerable cost to the state. 49 At the same time, there are an impressive number of inmates who might deservedly win their freedom if given an opportunity to appeal. 5 0 For this reason, a state court rule or statute which would substantially limit the scope of the Griffin principle would be both violative of the spirit of that decision and inconsistent with the liberal trend of American jurisprudence toward a justice free from economic discrimination. Therefore, both in its prospective and retroactive application, the Griflin decision should be promulgated into state law with a full appreciation of the problems which a carelessly formulated ruling might create.
A Proposed Statute or Court Rule
Any indigent person, convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor, may file, in the court in which he was convicted, a petition requesting that he be furnished without cost a complete stenocourt, rendered final the trial court's denial of a free transcript. This court apparently was either unaware of the Griffin case or felt that its action did not come within the scope of that ruling.
" 
